Modeling Interaction Effects in Polarization: Individual Media Influence and the Impact of Town Meetings by Grim, Patrick et al.
Modeling Interaction Eects in Polarization:
Individual Media Influence and the Impact of
TownMeetings
Eric Pulick1, Patrick Korth2, Patrick Grim3, Jiin Jung4
1DepartmentofMechanical Engineering, G.G.BrownLaboratory, 2350Hayward, AnnArbor,MI, 48109, United
States of America
2Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 1301 Beal Ave., Ann Arbor, MI, 48109, United
States of America
3Center for Study of Complex Systems, University of Michigan, 321AWest Hall, 1085 Ann Arbor, MI, 48109-1107,
United States of America
4Department of Psychology, Claremont Graduate University, 123 East Eight Street, Claremont, CA, 91711,
United States of America
Correspondence should be addressed to patrick.grim@stonybrook.edu
Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 19(2) 1, 2016
Doi: 10.18564/jasss.3021 Url: http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/19/2/1.html
Received: 25-05-2015 Accepted: 25-01-2016 Published: 31-03-2016
Abstract:We are increasingly exposed to polarizedmedia sources, with clear evidence that individuals choose
those sources closest to their existing views. We also have a tradition of open face-to-face group discussion
in town meetings, for example. There are a range of current proposals to revive the role of group meetings in
democratic decision-making. Here, we build a simulation that instantiates aspects of reinforcement theory in
a model of competing social influences. What can we expect in the interaction of polarized media with group
interaction along the lines of town meetings? Some surprises are evident from a computational model that
includes both. Deliberative group discussion can be expected to produce opinion convergence. That conver-
gence may not, however, be a cure for extreme views polarized at opposite ends of the opinion spectrum. In
a large class of cases, we show that adding the influence of group meetings in an environment of self-selected
media produces not a moderate central consensus but opinion convergence at one of the extremes defined by
polarized media.
Keywords: Polarization, Media, Opinion, Social Networks, Town Meetings, Reinforcement
Introduction
1.1 Both political media and the character of public meetings have changed radically over the past half-century.
The media of the 1960s were dominated by the largely interchangeable news coverage of CBS, ABC, and NBC;
today the opposing positions of Fox and MSNBC are a major media presence, as are the myriad internet sites
individuals can and do self-select in order to reinforce a given position (Iyengar & Hahn 2009; Sunstein 2009;
Stroud 2011; Pew Research Center 2012; Prior 2013). At the same time, there has been a dramatic decline in
the role of fraternal and other groups that aorded face to face discussion among local groups in ways that
oen cross-cut economic and political dierences — the Rotary Club, Elks, Lions, American Legion, Masons,
and Order of the Eastern Star (Skocpol 2013; Bishop 2008). There have been a range of contemporary appeals
for increased group deliberations in the form of citizen forums, ‘public spheres,’ or ‘mini-publics’ (Habermas
1996; Fishkin 1991, 1995, 2009; Bryan 2004; Fung 2006; Warren & Pearse 2008; Warren 2009; Niemeyer 2011;
Grönlund et al. 2013).
1.2 Prospects for individual self-selection of belief-tailoredmedia have increased. Prospects for deliberative group
discussion in the traditionof townmeetingshave seemed todecrease,with arguments that it shouldbe revived.
What consequences can we expect for political polarization from changes in these two variables? What eects
can we expect self-selected media sources have on opinion polarization in a population? What eects can we
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expect town meetings to have? The focus of our study here: in what ways might we expect these two opinion-
shaping forces to work together or in opposition, either moderating or amplifying opinion polarization across
a population?
1.3 We construct an agent-based model in the search for some insight into dynamics that may be operational in
our contemporary political environment. The basic mechanisms of that model are patterned on established
psychological principles. Its core is in the tradition of Axelrod’s model of cultural assimilation and dissociation,
directly targetingpolarization in termsof thebasicpsychological principlesofhomophily and imitation (Axelrod
1997; Castellano et al. 2000; Klemmet al. 2003a,b; Flache&Macy 2006). Byhomophily, people aremore likely to
interactwith thosewhosharemanyof their cultural attributes (McPhersonetal. 2001). By imitation, interactions
between people tend to increase the number of attributes they share (Festinger 1954).
1.4 To thosemechanismsweadd self-selectedmedia and the forceof group consensus as social reinforcers. Sched-
uled reinforcement is a stalwart of behavioral psychology (Ferster & Skinner 1957; Zeiler 1977; Morgan 2010).
The eectiveness of a reinforcer in strengthening or weakening a particular behavior depends not merely on
howmany times it has been given but on the schedule of reinforcement. The eectiveness with which a target
behavior is shaped or eliminated can depend not only on whether reinforcers are negative or positive but on
patterns of multiple combinatory reinforcers given before and/or aer the target behavior (Madden 2013; Mor-
gan2010; Zeiler 1977). Skinnerwas clear that reinforcersmaywell be cultural, evolved in a social environment in
precisely the sense employed here: "Human behavior is the joint product of (i) the contingencies of survival re-
sponsible for the natural selection of the species and (ii) the contingencies of reinforcement responsible for the
repertories acquired by its members, including (iii) the special contingencies maintained by an evolved social
environment, culture" (1981, p. 502).
1.5 It is undoubtedly true both that culture is the product of individual decisions and that individual decisions are
oen the product of cultural forces. The social dynamicsmaywell be complex (Mason et al. 2007). In this paper
we focus on mechanisms of scheduled and multiple social reinforcement in order to track the impact on po-
larization of interaction eects between self-selectedmedia and the influence of group consensus within town
meetings, ‘public spheres,’ or ‘mini-publics’ (Habermas 1996; Fishkin 1991, 1995, 2009; Fung 2006; Warren &
Pearse 2008; Warren 2009; Niemeyer 2011; Grönlund et al. 2013).
1.6 It is well known that the eect of superimposed schedules of reinforcement can dier significantly from the
eect of individual schedules alone and from any simple linear addition of eects (Wilkie 1972; Brechner 1977;
Brechner & Linder 1981; Williams 1983, 1994). But to our knowledge the interaction eects of superimposed
reinforcement schedules have not been broached in social modeling. Our results indicate complex interaction
eects between self-selected media and town meetings that would not have been expected from considering
either alone.
The Model
2.1 The model we use is a variation and extension of Axelrod (1997) that also incorporates selected features from
Deuant et al. (2000, 2002, 2004). We oer a condensed characterization followed by explanation of the moti-
vation for particular features and ties to background literature. Model code is available here.
2.2 Agents on a lattice each have a set of political beliefs, modelled as a list of 5 real-valued numbers from 1 to
10. Three types of interactions occur which may shi an agent’s political beliefs: neighbor interactions, me-
dia interactions, and the group interactions we term ’town meetings.’ Interaction of each type occurs with a
probability calculated from the over-all similarity between an agent and the target (neighbor, media source, or
average view of agents in townmeeting). Similarity is found by summing the dierence of each political belief,
normalizing bydividing by themaximumpossible dierence, then subtracting from 1. Using integer values for a
simple example, given that belief values range from 1 to 10, the belief sets [13543] and [55555] have a similarity
1− [(5− 1+5− 3+5− 5+5− 4+5− 3)/((10− 1) ∗ 5)] = 0.80. The sets [12121] and [55555] are less similar,
and have a similarity of 1 − (5 − 1 + 5 − 2 + 5 − 1 + 5 − 2 + 5 − 1)/((10 − 1) ∗ 5) = 0.60. If the similarity
between an agent and the target isX , the agent has anX% chance of shiing one of its political beliefs. We
randomly choose a single political belief that diers between the agent and the target, shiing that belief of
the agent halfway to that of the target. For example, if the agent’s belief is 2.07 and the other belief is 6.89, the
agent’s political belief value is set to 2.07 + (6.897 − 2.07) ∗ 0.5 = 4.48. For computational simplicity, values
are rounded to the nearest hundredth.
2.3 The first form of interaction we investigate is between neighbors. At each step or ’tick’ of the simulation, each
agent chooses a random one of its 8 neighbors. Given a similarity ofX to that neighbor, as outlined above, the
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Figure 1: An Axelrod lattice of cultures, consisting of 9 traits within 5 features Axelrod (1997).
agent has anX% probability of changing one of its political beliefs to match a dierent belief of its neighbor
1. The second form of interaction is between agents and polarized media. Here we use two constant agents at
opposite extremes of the political spectrum, one with all values at 1.00, another with all values at 10.00. Given
a similarityX to amedia source, agents interact with probabilityX with thatmedia source that is over-all most
similar, updating a randomly chosen belief as in the case of neighbor interaction. The third form of interaction
is in townmeetings, simulated by choosing a randomposition in the array and a distance radius of cells. Agents
within that radius are identified as meeting participants. The political beliefs of the participants are averaged
together and eachparticipant then adjusts each of its values halfway toward the values of that groupprototype.
2.4 Baseline simulations use ‘word of mouth’ interactions with neighbors. At sampling intervals we record the dis-
tribution of agents’ averaged belief values, allowing us to use standard deviation in order to track the pattern
of belief distribution over time. Against a background of neighbor interactions at each tick of the simulation,
we then independently record the changes in belief distributions produced by (i) polarized media interaction
of a fixed 10% of the population at dierent time intervals, and (ii) ’townmeetings’ of dierent radii at dierent
time intervals. Because our main interest is in the interaction of media and townmeetings, we report dierent
interval settings for the two that show clear interactive eects on polarization.
2.5 Our final analysis attempts to gauge the scope of these eects. In our initial simulations it diicult to separate
scheduling eects—how oen townmeetings occur, for example— from population proportion eects —what
proportion of the population is involved in town meetings. In our final analysis we eliminate the scheduling
eectbyenforcing the selected interactionmechanismseach tick, varyingonly theproportionof thepopulation
aected. With neighbor interaction as a constant background, theproportionof thepopulation interactingwith
media sources can vary from 0 to 100% as the proportion of the population interacting in town-meeting style
varies from 0 to 100% as well. Using standard deviation together with the global average of agents’ beliefs we
are able to graph dierent polarization patterns across combinations of percentage parameters, confirming in
greater definition the scope of the interaction eects identified in the earlier simulations.
Opinion Updating: Adapting the Axelrod Model
2.6 In Axelrod’s model of cultural diusion, agents in a bordered lattice (initially 10 x 10) are characterized by a rep-
resentation of ‘traits’ on each of a small number of ’features’ (see Figure 1). Axelrod thinks of traits, represented
as digits 0 through 9, as alternative cultural choices within, say, five cultural categories: alternative choices of
color for particular items of clothing, for example. A series 87305 is intended to represent a ’culture’ of dierent
trait choices on a given set of features. We incorporate the multiple features of the Axelrod model as a major
feature of our own, though reinterpreted in terms of suites of political opinions rather than aspects of a culture.
2.7 Axelrod attempts to capture two simple psychological principles of social influence: that people interact more
with those who are like them, and that people come to hold views more like the views of those with whom
they interact (Festinger 1954; McPherson et al. 2001). His core mechanism is one in which agents interact with
borderingneighbors in the arraywith aprobability proportionate to thenumber of features onwhich they share
identical traits. On each round, a random agent and one of its neighbors are chosen for possible interaction. A
pair with codes 87305 and 87392will have a 60% chance of interaction; neighbors with codes 87305 and 89246
will have only a 20% chance. Should interaction take place, the original agent changes one of its mismatched
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traits (randomly chosen) to match that of its neighbor. If 87305 is the original agent and 87342 is its chosen
neighbor, for example, the original agent may change its code to 87345.
2.8 Using homophily and imitation as basic principles of social influence, we follow Axelrod in using sets of mul-
tiple values. We reinterpret these as modeling sets of political views rather than cultural features, with belief
dynamicsmodeled as change across themultiple elements of those belief suites. In this respect themodel con-
trastswithmodelswritten in termsof single values,whetherdiscreteor continuous, characteristic of virtually all
other traditions in the literature (Galam 1997; Kacperski & Hołyst 2000; Hegselmann et al. 2002; Deuant et al.
2000, 2002, 2004). In contrast with Axelrod, we model those multiple values in line with the intuitions regard-
ing graduated opinion that guide the Deuant tradition (Deuant et al. 2000, 2002, 2004; McKeown & Sheehy
2006). Features are treated as opinion topics rather than aspects of a culture, with trait values conceived as a
spectrum of real values from 1 to 10 representing alternative positions on those topics.
2.9 We adapt rules for interaction and updating accordingly. In Axelrod’s model, features are taken as aspects of
a culture and distinct traits function simply as distinct alternatives. An agent’s trait value on feature 5 is either
distinct from that of its neighbor or not: a trait value of 8 is no closer to an alternative of 9 than is a trait value of
2. In our more sociopolitical interpretation, a series 8.027.563.190.615.97will represent a particular configura-
tion of shaded positions on, say, gun control, abortion, foreign policy, gay marriage, and immigration, ranging
perhaps from conservative to liberal. In our modeling, a position of 3.07 on gun control is closer to 2.67 than it
is to 9.56 (see also Flache & Macy 2006).
2.10 Agents interact with a probability that matches their similarity, but that similarity is measured not in terms of
full trait matches on features, as in Axelrod, but on trait proximity across the set of features as a whole. As
outlined above, we sum the total dierences in trait values across the entire set of features, dividing that by
the maximum possible dierence. In Axelrod’s model, the probability of interaction between individuals will
be zero when they match on no features—an aspect crucial to his modeling of polarization. In our model, be-
cause dissimilarity is measured by belief distance rather than trait match, probability of interaction virtually
never reaches absolute zero. When agents do interact, moreover, the alteration of a randomly chosen point of
disagreement will not be a sudden jump to the opinion value of the target. Our updating uses a slide of 50% in-
stead: on the randomly chosen position, the agent’s opinionwillmove halfway toward that of the target. Unlike
bounded confidencemodels (Dittmer 2001; Hegselmann et al. 2002; McKeown & Sheehy 2006), but in line with
relative agreement variations (Deuant et al. 2004), we think it most realistic to avoid any sharp threshold for
influence: any degree of similarity across belief suites allows for some probability of interaction and graduated
belief change.
2.11 We followboth the Axelrod andDeuant traditions inmodeling agent interaction on a lattice, with the influence
of immediate neighbors as a component. In modeling the influence of deliberative group discussion, however,
we also expand areas of influence beyond immediate neighbors to larger ‘town meeting’ patches in the lat-
tice. With the precedent of (McKeown & Sheehy 2006) we also introduce polarized media influence, but with a
mechanism intended tomodel self-selected exposure. Our focus over all is on the combined influence of these
forces when taken together: interaction eects of self-selected media together with town meetings as social
reinforcers.
2.12 The configurationof themodel, incorporating these features, is shown in Figure 2. Agents startwith randomized
traits, interacting with probabilities geared to over-all similarity and updating as a half-way approximation on
a randomly chosen feature. Background histograms using intervals of 0.25 show the basic shape of aggregate
values on features individually and combined, with color coding for liberal (red) or conservative (blue) leanings
of agents averaged over all features.
Schedules of Social Reinforcement: TownMeetings and Self-selected Media
2.13 We expand the model in our more explicitly political interpretation to explore two forms of social influence,
acting either independently or together. Wemodel self-chosenmedia influence as interactionwith unchanging
external opinion configurations chosen on the basis of similarity to an agent’s beliefs. Wemodel townmeetings
as influence within larger clusters of neighbors. How does each of these forces shape public opinion? Most
importantly, we want to explore what kind of interaction eects appear when bothmedia influences and town
meetings are in play simultaneously.
2.14 Models intended to include the eect of mass media have used both Axelrod’s and Deuant’s bounded confi-
dencemodels as a base (Shibanai et al. 2001; González-Avella et al. 2007), with some attention to both extrem-
ity of media influences and scheduling or ‘broadcast ratio’ (McKeown & Sheehy 2006). What has not been well
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Figure2: AnAxelrod latticeof cultures, consistingof9 traitswithin5 features (Axelrod 1997). A formof thecurrent
model in which traits are treated as continuous values, with probabilities of interaction in terms of over-all
similarity and updating as half-way approximation on a random feature. In this example 10% of the population
is also exposed to a closest media source, as outlined below. Generations 0, 30, 60 and 90 shown.
modeled is thewell-recognized sociological eect of self-selectedmedia (Sustein 2002; Sunstein 2009; Bennett
& Iyengar 2008; Iyengar & Hahn 2009; Stroud 2011; Levendusky 2013, 2014; Leeper 2014).
2.15 A clear feature of the contemporary broadcast and cable environment is the existence of politically polarized
media sources: Fox News and MSNBC are prime players, showing a clear conservative and liberal slant respec-
tively in their news reporting, their editorializing, and the combination of the two. It is to be expected that
individuals will seek out those media sources that echo and support their own political leanings (Iyengar &
Hahn 2009; Sunstein 2009; Stroud 2011; Prior 2013; Pew Research Center 2012). The predictable result will be a
strengthening of the initial leaning and reinforcement of those views that correspond to the slant of themedia
source chosen. Given a small number of media sources that are themselves polarized, self-selection of media
can be expected to have a polarizing eect on public opinion at large 2.
2.16 We follow McKeown & Sheehy (2006) in modeling two polarized media sources, though with continuous influ-
ence across elements in a suite of beliefs rather than a threshold cut-o of influence in a single belief 3. One
media source has opinions at 1.00 on the scale of all topics; the other has opinions at 10.00 for all topics. Like
McKeown&Sheehy (2006)we explored variations in degrees of polarization betweenmedia sources, but found
the simple fact that media sources are symmetrically polarized is what proves crucial, rather than the specific
points of polarization. Because results are similar at dierent separations we report just the extreme case here.
2.17 Individuals ’self-select’ that media source that is most similar to their belief set over all, interacting with that
media source with a probability based on over-all similarity. The fact that individuals most similar in opinion
to a media source will have the highest probability of interaction and thus influence by that source accords
perfectly with recent results on the eect of polarized media. Both Fiorina & Levendusky (2006); Levendusky
(2013, 2014) and Leeper (2014) oer experimental evidence that it is individuals with opinions at extremes that
are those most influenced by extrememedia.
2.18 Previous work has not included the eect of citizen forums, ‘public spheres,’ or ‘mini-publics’ in the tradition
of townmeetings, much touted in aspects of political science (Habermas 1996; Fishkin 1991, 1995, 2009; Bryan
2004; Fung 2006; Warren & Pearse 2008; Warren 2009; Niemeyer 2011; Grönlund et al. 2013). The psychological
processes of social influence and attitude change within a group have been well documented (Turner 1985).
Typically, a group is cognitively represented in terms of a group prototype, a set of attributes taken not only to
describe thegroupbut toprescribehowpeople should feel, think, andbehaveasgroupmembers, andhowthey
should evaluate themselves and others. Social influence occurs as people assimilate themselves to the proto-
type of the group they belong to. Drawing on this psychological principle, we have each agent in a modeled
group or town meeting interact with a prototypical position constructed by averaging values on each opinion
topic across thewhole, shiing a value to a point halfway between theirs and the prototypical position on each
feature.
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2.19 Word of mouth influence is restricted to each cell’s immediate neighbors. We model group influence in the
townmeeting tradition using larger areas of the array in which each cell is influenced by a prototypical position
that consists of values on each opinion topic that are simply the average for all members of the group. As a
participant in a groupmeeting, a cell updates values for each of its opinion topics by shiing to a point halfway
between its original position on that topic and the group average represented in the prototype. We also explore
how the size of groupmeetingsmayaect public opinion formation. Within anarrayof 400 cellswe treat a small
group as one in which individuals within a radius of 4 of that point interact, giving a group of 49 individuals.
A medium group meeting is set at a radius of 7, with 149 individuals. A large citizen forum takes a radius of
10, incorporating 317 individuals. With larger arrays using groups of the same population percentage we have
found comparable results.
2.20 What we consider most significant in the model oered here are prospects for studying the interaction of self-
selected media and group influence in social communication and opinion change. It is clear from the psycho-
logical literature that superimposing schedules of reinforcement fromdierent stimuli can produce results that
are importantly dierent from the individual stimuli schedules by themselves and from any linear addition of
their eects (Ferster & Skinner 1957; Wilkie 1972; Brechner 1977; Brechner & Linder 1981; Williams 1983, 1994).
Here we broach the interaction eects of superimposed reinforcement schedules in the context of social mod-
eling. What the results show are complex interaction eects between self-selected media and group or town
meetings that would not have been expected from considering either alone.
Results
3.1 We first examine how each of three social reinforcers (word of mouth, self-selected media, and town meet-
ings) shapes public opinions when operating individually. We next explore interaction eects of the social re-
inforcers by applying dierent reinforcement schedules. We conclude by testing the robustness of observed
eects across a full range of parameter combinations.
Word of Mouth
3.2 Agents across a 20 x 20 array start with randomized traits 1 through 10 in each of 5 feature slots 4. A random
agent and one of his neighbors are chosen each generation, with a probability of interaction given by their trait
proximity across all features, as outlined above. If the two do interact, one randomly chosen trait of the agent
is moved by a slider of 50% toward that of its neighbor.
3.3 Where agents update merely by word of mouth communication, interacting with their more similar neighbors
and becoming more similar as a result, opinion across the population as a whole converges to an increasingly
tight and increasingly uniform central position on the opinion scale.
3.4 Figure 3 shows the evolution of a typical random array. Background histograms indicate convergence at a cen-
tral value for each of 5 features. The aggregate histogram and color coding show that convergence in terms
added values for each agent across all 5 features.
3.5 Standard deviation can be used as a simple measure of histogram configuration. Simple convergence at the
middle, as here, is indicated by the move to low standard deviation shown in Figure 4.
3.6 In ourmodel, as in Axelrod’s and other predecessors, one can oen see the development of local color regions,
light blue for one side of the spectrum and pink for the other, for example. In our model, however, because
dissimilarity is measured by trait distance rather than trait match and without any sharp threshold at which
influence is cut o, probability of interaction virtually never reaches absolute zero. Interaction therefore con-
tinues, as does the growth of consensus and similarity 5.
TownMeetings
3.7 We retainword ofmouth as a background socialmechanism, adding group or townmeetings as outlined above
at a schedule of specific intervals: for every 25 ticks at which individuals interact by word of mouth with imme-
diate neighbors, for example, a townmeetingwill occur in the radius of a randomly chosen point in the array. At
a radius of 4, a small group includes 49 individuals of a 400 cell array. At a radius of 7, a medium group consists
of 149. A large group, at radius 10, incorporates 317. When group influence of this form is added, of any radius,
the result is still convergence to the center (Figure 5). Changes in other parameters result only in a dierence in
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Figure 3: Increasing convergence on each feature with only word of mouth contact with neighbors. One pair
chosen for interactionwith probability in termsof over-all similarity each generation, images shownat intervals
of 0, 3000, 6000, 9000, 12000 and 15000.
Figure 4: Decline in standard deviation in a histogram of agents’ combined values on all features with word of
mouth communication alone. Data sampled at intervals of 1000.
speed. The larger the meetings, and the more frequently they occur, the faster the population comes to a cen-
tral consensus. Using standard deviation as a simple measure of distribution, Figure 6 shows the correlation
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Figure 5: The convergence eect of town meetings. Medium-sized meetings, radius 7, at intervals of 25 ticks.
Generations 0, 200, 400, 600, 800 and 1000 shown.
Figure 6: Standard deviation as ameasure of speed of convergence for dierentmeeting sizes. Meeting sizes of
49, 149, and 317 individuals. All meetings at intervals of 200 ticks.
between size of townmeetings and speed to consensus.
3.8 To this point, using either word of mouth or townmeetings, the lesson of the model is simply a lesson in opin-
ion convergence. Both word of mouth and town meetings are forces toward agreement of opinion across a
population 6. Results turn out to be importantly dierent with self-selected media.
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Figure 7: Popular polarization as an eect of self-selectedmedia. Media at 1 and 10, with 10% of the population
interacting each 100 ticks with the closest media source with a probability correlate to similarity. Generations
0, 50, 100, 150, 200 and 250 shown.
Self-selectedmedia
3.9 Given self-selection of polarized media sources as outlined above, results show opinion bifurcation across the
population, with each side driing toward the closest media source (Figure 7) 7. Simulation results are in line
with empirical evidence (Pew Research Center 2012; Prior 2013) and follow precisely the pattern background
intuitions would suggest.
3.10 The reinforcement schedule for the possibility ofmedia exposure, like for groupmeetings, can be set at various
intervals. For every 100, 200, or 300 ticks at which individuals interact with neighbors, a certain percentage of
the population — here set at an arbitrary 10% — is exposed to the similarity-based probability of interaction
with the closest media source. Like word of mouth influence from immediate neighbors, probability of interac-
tion is determined by similarity between opinion configurations in the individual and the closest media source
8. Figure 8 shows standard deviation as a measure for polarization over time for dierent intervals of media
exposure.
Interaction of Media and TownMeetings
3.11 The most interesting and complex results appear when we put both influences into play. Results for the inter-
action of the two social reinforcers acting together are shown in Figure 9. With media influence as outlined
every 50 ticks and medium-sized town meetings at the same rate, standard deviation remains high: a sign of
sustained polarized bifurcation at the ends of the spectrum. As media influence appears at longer intervals —
aer only every 100 ticks, 150, or 200— eects of convergence slowly overpower polarized bifurcation over the
course of a run. With media accessed at 100 ticks or above, the dominant eect of town meetings results in a
convergence of opinion across the community.
3.12 Hidden in standarddeviation as a singlemeasure, however, is an important interference eect betweenour two
social reinforcers. What is particularly worthy of note is a dynamic involving two successive movements in the
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Figure 8: Increasing standard deviation as a measure of polarization for dierent media intervals. Media at 1
and 10, all individuals interacting with most similar media source with probability correlate to similarity. Data
sampled at intervals of 1000 ticks.
Figure 9: Standard deviation formediummeetings at intervals of 50 tickswith various rates of self-selectedme-
dia influence. Notepatternsof initial polarization followedbyconvergence. Inall of the latter cases convergence
is at one of the extreme ends of the opinion spectrum. Data sampled at each 1000 ticks.
pattern of development. Consider for example the development of standard deviation in Figure 9 at a media
rate of 150, 200, or 250. Here standard deviation first rises—indicating a polarized bifurcation in opinion—and
only then converges9.
3.13 What is happening is illustrated in the successive frames and histograms of Figure 10. What first appears is a
polarized bifurcation of opinion, familiar from the pattern of media influence. This is then followed by opinion
convergence, on the pattern of town meetings. But with the media influence in place, the convergence that
results is not at the center of the opinion spectrum but rather at one of the extremes defined by the media
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Figure 10: Interaction eect of medium-sized town meetings at intervals of 50 ticks with self-selected media
influence at intervals of 300 ticks. Initial polarization is followed by convergence, but convergence at one of the
extremes.
sources.
3.14 The influencesof self-selectedmediaandof townmeetingsare thusnotmerely competitive. It is notmerely that
one will dominate, with the result being either central convergence or bifurcated polarization. Where influence
via townmeetings ismore frequent than that of self-selectedmedia, holding constantmeetings ofmediumsize,
the modelled social dynamics produces neither central convergence nor bifurcated polarization. The result is
indeed convergence, as in the eect of town meetings alone, but convergence at one end of the spectrum of
opinion—an eect clearly influenced by polarized media, but not one that is an eect of media alone.
The Scope of Interaction Eects
3.15 How pervasive is the interaction eect of media and town meetings observed above? In order to understand
which parameter sets yieldwhich outputs, we enlarge our array and re-tool themodel to standardize the eects
of media and town hall meeting interactions. In this form the variable for each influence is not the tick-interval
of exposurebutpercentageof thepopulationexposed toan influenceat each tickof the simulation. At each tick,
individuals in a 200 x 200 array interact with neighbors in terms of similarity as before. At each tick, however,
Y% of the population is also involved in a clustered town hall meeting. At each tick, with probability based on
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Figure 11: Color coding and sample histograms for various outcomes in the interaction of population self-
selected media and town hall meetings. This color coding is used in Figure 12.
over-all similarity,X% of the population also interacts with their closest media source: our modeling for self-
selected media exposure. By varying the percentage of the population involved at each tick in town meetings
and self-selected media exposure we can explore interaction eects without some of the complexities tracked
with temporal scheduling. Standard deviation was used above as a means of judging the end state of opinion
across the population. Herewe attempt amore complete view. Usingmeasures for global average belief values
and standard deviation together, we distinguish the range of possible outcomes shown in Figure 11.
3.16 The outcome (a) in which there is a close convergence of belief at the center of the political spectrumwill have
an approximately central value for global average belief and a very small standard deviation. That outcome
will be coded in purple. An outcome (b) with central convergence that is somewhat less pronouncedwill have a
central value for global average and amoderate standard deviation, coded in green. Outcome (c) inwhich there
is polarized bifurcation on each side of the center will retain a central value for global average but have wide
standard deviation, coded in yellow. The remaining two cases mark convergence at one end of the spectrum.
Case (d), indicating moderate movement to one side in terms of a non-central average andmoderate standard
deviation, is indicated in a light brown. Case (e) is of particular interest: strong convergence on one extreme of
the spectrum, indicated by non-central average and low standard deviation. This is the case wemark in red.
3.17 With color coding for these outcomes, we construct a heatmapof interaction results using (i) percentages of the
population involved ina townmeetingeach tick and (ii) percentagesof thepopulationwhichmaybe interacting
with self-selected media each tick, each measured from 0 to 100% in steps of 1%. The six images of Figure 12
show the belief distributions for 10,000 200 x 200 arrays at six stages of development.
3.18 At 25 ticks of development, belief distribution shows polarized bifurcation (yellow) for most of the sampled ar-
rays. Arrays characterized by a high enough percentage involved in town hall meetings, however, still show the
central consensus indicated by green. The rough distribution of green and yellow across parameter combina-
tions that is evident at 25 ticks remains as something of a background to further stages of development — a
background against which another pattern plays out.
3.19 Starting at 50 ticks in the evolution, increasing numbers of arrays show a pattern of non-centralized conver-
gence. First brown (non-central consensus with medium standard deviation) and then red (non-central con-
sensuswith low standard deviation) invade the heatmap from the top. Red represents consensus at an opinion
extreme, which over time appears in arrays with progressively smaller percentages involved in town meetings
and self-selectedmedia. Consensus at an extreme appears first for arrays that previously showed a centralized
consensus (green), indicating amovement of consensus from the center to the extreme. But the same extreme
consensus also eventually appears for arrays that previously showedabimodal polarization (yellow), indicating
a movement from opinion bifurcation to consensus at one end of the opinion spectrum.
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Figure 12: Outcomes of interaction eects developing over time, with t indicating ticks. Color coding is as in
Figure 11, with purple and green for centralized consensus, yellow for polarized bifurcation and brown and red
for convergence at one extreme of the belief spectrum.
3.20 Consider for example a single array from the 10,000 shown in each of the heatmaps in Figure 12. At roughly the
black spot in the first frame is an array in which 15% of the population is involved each tick in the self-selected
media interaction outlined, with 40% of the population involved in a town-hall meeting. At 25 ticks, this array
shows centralized consensus. By 100 ticks, it shows conversion to a non-central consensus (brown) to one side.
By 150 ticks it shows a convergence at one extremeof the opinion scale (red). Indeed by 150 ticks themajority of
arrays in the heat map, representing the majority of parameter combinations, show consensus at an extreme.
3.21 What the heat maps of parameter sweeps demonstrate is the robust pervasiveness of the eect outlined in the
specific examples of earlier sections. Town hall meetings have a consensus eect: updating on the common
wisdom of the group brings views together. Where media are themselves polarized, self-selected media show
a polarizing eect on belief patterns. But where the two operate together, progressively across a wide range
of parameter values for each, the result is neither polarized bifurcation nor central consensus. The eect of
interaction between townmeetings and self-selectedmedia is opinion convergence at an extreme of the belief
scale—an extreme that is itself set by one of the media sources in play. A number of model modifications re-
main for further exploration. Here, for example, percentages of the population involved in a townmeeting are
percentages included in a single town meeting; a percentage of 40% indicates a single town meeting in which
40%of the population participates. An alternativeworth exploration is one inwhich the sameproportion of the
population is involved in somemeeting or other, but in which that proportion may represent a sum of smaller
meetings.
3.22 A number of model parameters have been set arbitrarily, including the amount that a numeric belief value
changes as a result of an interaction. Variation of many such parameters remains to be explored, tied perhaps
to experimental values from social psychology.
Discussion
4.1 Drawing on Axelrod’s culture model (1997), with modifications in line with Deuant et al. (2000, 2002, 2004),
the topic of the current work is how interaction eects between two social reinforcers—town meetings and
self-selected media—can shape public opinion. Simulation results follow background intuitions: town meet-
ings produce a convergence of opinion at the center, while self-selectedmedia polarize opinion at distinct me-
dia points. When the two reinforcers operate together, however, the result can be convergence at one of the
extremes defined by media.
4.2 Viewed in terms of schedule, a clear example is the case ofmiddle levels ofmeeting size (140 of 400 individuals)
withmeetings at intervals of 50 ticks and self-selectedmedia influence tied to similarity at intervals of 150. Here
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opinion first shows polarized bifurcation, a clear eect of polarizedmedia. At a later stage opinion converges, a
clear influence of town meetings. Final convergence, however, is not central but at one extreme of the media-
defined poles of opinion (Figure 9).
4.3 The same eect appears clearly in a parameter sweep for percentages between 0 and 100 of the population
involved in (i) town meetings and (ii) self-selected media in large (200 x 200) arrays. Results show a robust
tendency developing over time for a majority of arrays to converge to consensus opinion at one of the media-
defined poles. The eect is clear anddefined at 150 ticks for arrays inwhich town-meeting percentage equals or
exceeds the percentage of individuals exposed tomedia influencewith a probability geared to similarity (Figure
12).
4.4 One way of putting the result, phrased in terms of media influence, is this: Polarized media clearly have an ef-
fect on public opinion in the model, but have a very dierent eect depending on the presence or absence of
town meetings. Without town meetings, polarized media result in polarized bifurcation of opinion. With town
meetings, bifurcation is not a final result. Because of polarized media, however, the place at which consensus
occurs is not central but toward an extreme. The results can also be phrased in terms of town meetings. Town
meetings clearly have a consensus eect on public opinion in the model, but have a very dierent eect de-
pending in the presence or absence of polarized media. Without polarized media, town meetings produce a
central consensus. With polarized media they continue to have a consensus eect, but a consensus at one of
the extremes defined by the media.
4.5 An intuitive mechanism can be seen to be driving these results. Individuals, initially with randomly assigned
opinions, self-select toward dierent media sources. As individuals at dierent ends are pulled farther apart,
the result is a distribution with wide standard deviation, either because it forms a broadened normal curve
or an initial bimodal distribution. That wide distribution, however, will rarely be perfectly balanced. Given an
unbalanced distribution, the convergence eect of town hall meetings will form a concentration of opinion at
either one side of the center of the opinion spectrum or the other. Once the center of opinion is even slightly to
one side or the other of the center, the pull of media on that side will continue, moving any established central
consensus progressively toward one of the poles of media-defined opinion.
4.6 Ours is a modeling result, and as such is merely suggestive. What it suggests, however, is the intriguing hy-
pothesis that the eects of (a) self-selected media and (b) group or town meeting deliberations should not be
expected to function independently. There is clear psychological evidence that self-selectedmedia polarize in-
dividual opinion in a community (Iyengar & Hahn 2009; Sunstein 2009; Stroud 2011; Pew Research Center 2012;
Prior 2013). Commonwisdom, at least, is that groupdiscussionon themodel of townhallmeetingswill promote
convergence of opinion (Fishkin 1991, 1995, 2009; Fung 2006; Warren & Pearse 2008; Niemeyer 2011; Grönlund
et al. 2013). When the two social reinforcers are acting together, however, it should not be expected that they
will simply balance each other out. Group or town meetings can be expected to have a consensus eect on
opinion. Given constant enough influence from self-selection of polarized media, opinion bifurcation will be
the rule. Where both forces are in play, the resulting pattern is oen community consensus, but community
consensus at one of the extremes defined bymedia. What our results suggest is that polarizedmedia can shape
the opinion landscape — ‘define the question,’ as it were — against which even convergence eects in group
discussion, citizen forums, ‘public spheres,’ or ‘mini-publics’ will play out.
Appendix: Pseudo-code
Here is the model pseudocode.
Notes
1We have considered both Von Neumann and Moore neighborhoods, finding no important dierence. We
report Moore neighborhood results for word of mouth throughout.
2Intuitively, onemight expect the entrenchmentof opinion fragmentation tobeevenmore severewithmore
than a few self-selectedmedia sources, of a greater variety—websites, discussion groups, and blogs. Empirical
evidenceseems tosuggest this is amorecomplexandnuancedquestion thanmightat first sightappear (Adamic
& Glance 2005; Hargittai et al. 2008; Gilbert et al. 2009).
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3McKeown&Sheehy (2006) do not include townhall or interaction eects. It should be noted, however, that
one of the regimes they describe is that we document here with a combination of media and town meetings:
opinion convergence at one extreme aer a period of persistent opinion exchange.
4We have found essentially the same eects starting with a normally distributed distribution of initial opin-
ions.
5The crucial fact in both thismodel and others is that probabilities for interaction never reach absolute zero.
That is the fundamental reason why Axelrod diversity disappears with the addition of noise in Klemm et al.
(2003a). The fact that interaction probabilities can reach zero when bounded confidence levels are added also
explains how diversity can reappear in Flache & Macy (2006).
6We have noted above that our model tracks psychological work on meeting influence in terms of a group
prototype (Turner 1985). We have also explored an alternative interaction rule for townmeetings in which each
agent has a single interaction with each of all other agents in the group, acting with more distant agents in the
meeting as if they were immediate neighbors. Results for this alternative showed no significant dierence.
7Convergence at each end of the polarization is on the position of the media sources. Here we have used
extreme positions, giving convergence is at those extremes. In cases where we position media at .25 and .75,
say, we get polarized convergence to those points.
8Experimentation with dierent population percentages shows only predictable results: exposing 20% of
the population at intervals of 100 ticks gives results essentially identical to exposing 10% at intervals of 200.
9The visible oscillation at an interval of 350 is due to the fact that our sampling is at 1000 ticks. At an interval
of 350, one of our forces (town meetings or self-selected meetings) may be dominant at one sampling point,
with the other dominant at the next.
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